The conduct of elections for the House of Representatives and agencies of local government is closely regulated by statute; in contrast, elections for other bodies is to a large extent free from statutory control, although certain minimal requirements are usually specified either by statute or by the rules of the body concerned. As a result, the procedure and machinery for election for the various bodies does differ in detail. For the House of Representatives and agencies of local government, voting is done by the marking of a printed ballot paper containing the names of all candidates. The ballot papers are supplied to the voter at special polling places which are provided with private cubicles; on receiving a ballot paper the voter must, without discussing the matter with anyone, retire into one of these cubicles and cancel out the names he rejects. The marked paper he then folds and places in a locked box, again without discussion, and these recorded notes are later counted by the election officials in the presence of scrutineers appointed by each candidate. The ballot papers are not signed by the voter, but they are numbered to enable a check to be made to see if a voter has voted twice; but this check is performed in the presence of the scrutineers, and is not used for any other purpose.

No physical or other interference with electors, otherwise then by written or oral argument unaccompanied by force, threats, bribery, or the like, is permitted at any time, and on the actual day of the election no form of electioneering is permitted; it is also prohibited to seek to obtain information, or to disclose such information, as to how an elector voted, and each candidate is required to render an official account for all his election expenses. Although within living memory there have been a small number of breaches of these requirements, they have all been of a technical nature not characterised by any improper motive.

As regards bodies not of a governmental character, they are permitted very much to regulate their own procedure as they think fit by their rules, with the exception of educational institutions which are regulated by statute, and with the qualification that trade unions are required to adopt a procedure which is “sufficiently democratic” to the satisfaction of the Registrar of Industrial Unions. The procedure of the election varies from the fairly extensive formalities usually adopted in the rules of trade unions and large companies for voting by means of printed ballot papers dispatched to the electors, marked by the voter where he chooses, and posted or handed back to officials of the union or company, to the less formal method of writing on a slip of paper at a meeting of electors, or even by voting by voices or show of hands at such a meeting, which is adopted by smaller organisations.

Although registration as an elector is compulsory where mere residence is a qualification for voting — i.e., House of Representatives, borough and county councils, road boards and town boards — and is automatic in other cases by compilation from the records of the body concerned, in no case is it compulsory to vote. It is usual for each elector to be permitted to vote once only, but in respect of those bodies in which the franchise is, or was until recently, based exclusively upon a property qualification — county councils, road boards, land-drainage boards, water-supply boards, local railways boards, rabbit boards, and river boards — electors are entitled to a number of votes proportionate to the rating value of their property; so also in companies, the voting power frequently varies according to the value and type of shareholding.

Elections for bodies of a private nature are usually held each year, but for other bodies in respect of which it is felt that annual elections would be too costly and disruptive of policy and administration, elections are held at greater intervals. Thus for the House of Representatives, and most agencies of local government, elections take place every three years.

There are very few bodies, e.g., the Christchurch Drainage Board, for which no qualifications are prescribed for candidates for election, but this is unusual. For the House of Representatives and agencies of local government it is required that a candidate be qualified as an elector; excluded normally, however, are undischarged bankrupts, aliens, prisoners, and persons convicted of serious offences, persons of unsound mind, and persons whose financial interests may conflict with the interests of the body concerned. As regards private bodies, the conditions are not normally so extensive, qualification as an elector usually being sufficient.

In private and public bodies alike, a person cannot stand for the same office more than once at the same election, but there is normally no restriction upon a person standing for re-election to the same office upon conclusion of his term, or standing for election to any number of bodies, public or private. In no case is there any qualification or disqualification by reason of affiliation to any party or other association, political or otherwise.

Although the details of the qualifications of persons entitled to vote vary with the different bodies, certain broad principles may be discerned. As a minimum, persons who are subject to the direct financial exactions of the body concerned, are, by reason of that very fact, normally authorised to participate in elections of the officers for that body: thus persons liable for rates to a local authority are normally entitled to vote at its elections, as are financial members in respect of private associations, and shareholders in respect of companies. The elections for House of Representatives does tend towards an exception in some respects to this general principle, in that whilst it levies taxes upon all persons earning income over a certain figure regardless of residence, nationality, age, and criminal record, the franchise for its elections is more restricted in all four respects.

Although the criterion of direct financial liability does provide a minimum basis of qualification for electors, it is not exclusive, because some elective bodies do not levy financial exactions, and even if they do, frequently their powers are so wide as to affect vitally many persons otherwise than by taxation. It is therefore considered that such persons should be able to protect their interests by participating in the election of officers.

With some few bodies Parliament has felt that this effect has been achieved by means of appointments to the body concerned by the Government as representing the general public interest (e.g., New Zealand Dairy Board, New Zealand Meat Producers Board), or of appointments by institutions which are themselves elected by the persons concerned (e.g., Auckland Metropolitan Drainage Board, milk authorities). For most public bodies, however, this effect is attained by a widening of the franchise to include all adult persons directly affected by powers of the body concerned. Thus for the governing bodies of secondary schools and education boards, all parents of children attending the school(s) concerned are entitled to vote; for the House of Representatives, licensing committees, and most agencies of local government, adult residents within the area of jurisdiction are entitled to vote equally with ratepayers or taxpayers. It is in respect of river boards, water-supply boards, land-drainage boards, rabbit boards, and local railway boards, that a property or financial qualifications is exclusive nowadays in the plane of local government; as regards bodies of a private nature, however, it is normal to restrict the right to vote to those who have a direct financial interest in its activities, e.g., shareholders of companies, financial members of associations.

In respect of many bodies where the persons entitled to vote are numerous and likely to have varying interests, provision is made for them to be grouped accordingly to ensure an adequate representation of their interests. Thus the voters for the House of Representatives are divided into electoral districts on a geographical and racial basis; voters for licensing committees, some borough councils, county councils, education boards, the governing bodies of universities, and of some occupations, are also grouped on a geographical basis. Similarly, the voters for trade unions and companies are frequently grouped to ensure an adequate representation of varying occupational and shareholding interests.

On the plane of national government the main legislative organ — the House of Representatives — is elective, whilst the executive, the judiciary, and the second, but purely formal, legislative organ — the Governor-General – are appointed. In local government the basic agencies of a general functional nature — borough council, county council, town district, road board — are required by statute to be elective, as are also most agencies of a more specialised functional nature (such as electric power boards, harbour boards, licensing committees), and agencies of a specialised local application (such as Hawke's Bay Crematorium Board, Selwyn Plantation Board, and Greytown Trust Lands Board). In addition, Parliament has required that certain other bodies, although not organs of the national or local government, are to be elected; e.g., governing bodies of educational institutions, and of some occupations and professions. With bodies of a more private nature, such as companies, societies, clubs, and the like, although Parliament has not specifically required that they be elective, in fact they have normally by their rules adopted election as the appropriate method of selection for office. In respect of all the foregoing bodies, however, election is normally confined to the offices controlling the policy of the body concerned: the secretariat, administrative, and executive staff are normally appointed by the body itself, with the main exception of the office of secretary in private associations which, by reason of its influence on policy in such a body, is normally required by the rules to be elective.

Before proceeding to consider elections proper, it should be noted that the selection for some offices, although nominally by way of appointment, does savour to some extent of the substance of election. This is particularly so in respect of appointments which are required by Parliament to be made on the nomination of, or to be representative of, certain persons, as for instance the six members of the New Zealand Meat Producers Board whom the Governor-General is authorised to appoint, but on the nomination of the producers of meat for export. It also applies to a lesser extent even where the appointment is not specifically required to be representative: thus the selection of Judges, nominally by appointment of the Governor-General, is in fact the result of a joint decision of the law societies and Judges. It would be a mistake to consider that such offices are filled by formal election, but on the other hand it would be an oversimplification to believe that the decision was solely that of the nominal appointor, and that they were thus solely in fact, as in law, appointive.

These effects, however, can be obtained only if elections are held sufficiently frequently before past action becomes an immediate fait accompli; if there are sufficient candidates for election offering alternative policies; and if those entitled to elect are able to judge accurately what conduct was, and is likely to be, displeasing. Moreover, it is always a question whether what is pleasing or displeasing is in fact of real advantage or detriment, and whether the persons authorised to vote do comprise all those persons for whose benefit the actions of the office holders should be controlled. From an administrative point of view elections are costly in terms of money, and they may also cause worth-while action to be abandoned lest it be not appreciated by the electors at the time of the next election. Further, there are some offices which are required to be of a dignified and impartial nature that could well be destroyed by anything in the nature of a public campaign for election.

Accordingly, whilst election is the method most frequently employed in New Zealand for selecting persons to hold both public and private office, it is not invariably adopted and, moreover, where it is employed, certain requirements are usually imposed to minimise any of the possible disadvantages that might accrue.

Election as the method of selecting the person or persons to hold office by means of a joint decision of more than one person or institution, is to be distinguished from the method of appointment by means of a sole decision of one person. Election can have the direct effect of enabling the persons entitled to vote to remove from office persons who have been, or are likely to be, displeasing to them, and to install such persons as are likely to be pleasing; in this way past actions can be altered and future action controlled, for the benefit of those entitled to vote.

The best and most recent general work on New Zealand government is K. J. Scott, The New Zealand Constitution, Oxford University Press (1962), which contains a full treatment of the constitutional role of Parliament. J. L. Robson (ed.), New Zealand, The Development of its Laws and Constitution, London, Stevens and Sons Ltd. (1954), may also be consulted. The New Zealand Parliamentary Record, 1840–1949 (edited by G. H. Scholefield), is an official illustrated history and contains complete rolls of past members of both chambers during the period, with their electorates and dates of election, or dates of appointment, and the parliamentary offices they held. There are lists of Governors and Governors-General, Ministries, electorates and their successive representatives, dates of sessions, and similar details.

L. Lipson, The Politics of Equality, University of Chicago Press (1948), provides an account of the political background. It is somewhat out of date for this purpose, but is still the most recent general work available.

A number of articles in the journal Political Science, published by the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Victoria University of Wellington, deal with aspects of Parliament not fully covered here. The most useful are the following: Dean E. McHenry, “Broadcasting of Parliamentary Debates”, Vol. 7, No. 1; R. N. Kelson, “Voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives”, Vol. 7, No. 2; and Austin Mitchell, “The New Zealand Parliaments of 1935–60”, Vol. 13, No. 1. The last of these contains a biographical analysis of membership of the House during the period indicated. The proceedings of the House are reported verbatim in Hansard, the familiar name for the official New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, issued in bound volumes of convenient size at the end of each session with sessional index, by the Government Printer, Wellington. Other publications of importance are the Journals, the record of the decisions of the House, and the Appendices to the Journals, which contain reports to the House by the committees and other bodies, and various papers and returns.

by Reginald James Harrison, B.SC.ECON.(LOND.), B.A. (DE PAUW), PH.D.(OHIO STATE), Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Victoria University of Wellington.

With the object of creating an informed public opinion, the proceedings of Parliament are broadcast during normal sitting hours, though broadcasting hours may be extended at the discretion of the Leader of the House. The effects of broadcasting cannot, of course, be completely ascertained. Some disadvantages and advantages are, however, clear. There is a tendency for speeches in the House, particularly at peak listening times, to be addressed as much to the listening audience as to other members. A “hustings”, rather than a debating style, is likely to be adopted. The cut and thrust of debate and its spontaneity are allowed to suffer in order to reserve best radio hours for leading party spokesmen. The effect of broadcasting on the listening audience is more intangible. The few illusions retained by New Zealanders about their Parliament are not, on the whole, those which bring it into esteem. An unsophisticated audience, at work during the day, becomes familiar with only one aspect of parliamentary life and virtually one class of business: debates on orders of the day in the evening. The contempt which familiarity breeds is the price which Parliament has to pay for the equally intangible educational value of broadcasting.

by Reginald James Harrison, B.SC.ECON.(LOND.), B.A. (DE PAUW), PH.D.(OHIO STATE), Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Victoria University of Wellington.

In the representation and formation of public opinion the major general debates are of principal importance. Special inquiries by select committees also provide a useful forum in which interests and opinions can make themselves heard. The major general debates are the address in reply to the speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament, the debate on the Budget or financial statement, and the various debates on Imprest Supply Bills.

The first two of these give ordinary members an opportunity to air their views freely on any subject they choose from the national interest to the special aspirations of their constituents. Imprest supply debates are more specialised. On such Bills, the British principle of raising grievances before granting supply has been applied by allowing the Opposition to choose the subject for debate.

The substantive motion by the Opposition to censure, challenge, or criticise the Government, commonly employed in other parliaments for the discussion of some controversial aspect of government policy, is used in New Zealand only on very rare occasions.

Resolutions expressing want of confidence are, however, frequently proposed as amendments to the address in reply or as amendments to the motion for the second reading of a Bill.